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Dynamic Relationship between China’s Inward  
and Outward Foreign Direct Investments 
 
Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic relationship of China’s inward and outward foreign 
direct investments (FDI). It first identifies the key determinants of China’s outward FDI 
(OFDI) in 172 host countries during 2003-09 using a partial stock adjustment model. It finds 
strong evidence of dynamic adjustment in China’s OFDI stock with an agglomeration effect. 
The dynamic adjustment and agglomeration effects are stronger in “high-tech” countries than 
in “low-tech” ones but indifferent in host country’s resource endowments and income levels. 
The empirical results suggest that there exists a substantial adjustment cost in China’s OFDI 
and that China’s existing OFDI stock can gradually adjust towards its long term equilibrium 
level, which is not only greater but also more volatile than the actual stock. Of particular 
interest is that we find a strong and positive relationship between lagged inward FDI (IFDI) 
and contemporaneous OFDI, implying that capital outflow from China has been partially 
induced by the countries which have invested in China. 
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1. Introduction  
The geo-economic pattern of foreign direct investments (FDI) has changed significantly since 
2000 as developed countries’ domination has been seriously challenged by the emerging and 
transition economies. The share of global FDI accounted for by the developed world declined 
from over 90% in the end of the 20th century to only 65% by 2012. 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) in developed countries took a “wait-and-see” approach or 
divested their assets from host countries (UNCTAD 2013). In contrast, MNEs from emerging 
and transition economies took an aggressive approach in overseas expansion, led by the so-
called BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). 
Developed-country MNEs usually combine their ownership and internalisation advantages 
with location advantage to minimise the overall cost of operation (Dunning et al. 2001). Such 
conventional FDI theory only partially explains the internationalisation of emerging economy 
MNEs (EMNEs). Recent theoretical research suggests that EMNEs use OFDI (outward FDI) 
as a springboard to acquire strategic resources and to overcome institutional and market 
constraints at home (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
There have been a number of empirical studies on the determinants or motivations of  
EMNEs’ overseas expansion (Makino et al. 2002; Yamakawa et al. 2008), particularly those 
based on Chinese experiences (Buckley et al. 2007; Cheung and Qian 2009; Zhang and Daly, 
2011; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al. 2012). However, these studies investigate 
the attraction factors of OFDI from China and other emerging economies in a static 
framework. None of them considers the dynamic adjustment of OFDI stock towards its long 
term equilibrium.  
This paper aims to fill this literature gap through investigating the dynamic adjustment 
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process of China’s OFDI in 172 countries during 2003-09. China is selected of interest 
because it has become the largest investor among all the developing countries and the third 
largest investor in the world (UNCTAD 2013). We construct a partial stock adjustment model 
proposed in Cheng and Kwan (2000), which enables us to examine the dynamic adjustment 
effect of OFDI and to restore its unobservable equilibrium stock value. Estimating the 
equilibrium OFDI stock and comparing it with the actual stock can help us understand 
China’s OFDI behaviour from a new dimension.  
As China has become one of the largest recipients as well as one of the largest investors of 
foreign capital in the world, it is an ideal candidate to study the intrinsic relationship between 
IFDI (inward FDI) and OFDI. However, the empirical evidence in the OFDI literature is 
limited. This paper considers the impact of IFDI stock on China’s OFDI in the host countries. 
Other control variables include bilateral trade, market size, GDP growth, income level, 
openness, institution quality, inflation, resource endowment and technology of the host 
countries. It further investigates if the effects of these factors vary with some host country 
characteristics, such as technology, resources and incomes. A system generalised method of 
moments (system GMM) technique is used for estimation.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews China’s OFDI in 
recent years. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature on the location choice of China’s OFDI. 
Section 4 presents data, methodology and the empirical model of partial adjustment in OFDI. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. The final section concludes. 
2. Development of China’s OFDI 
 
China’s OFDI has expanded substantially since the country entered to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the launch of the ‘Go Global’ strategy in 2002. China has 
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established an OFDI policy system including a series of promotion measures and monitoring 
policies to support its MNEs investing overseas (Luo et al. 2010). During the 2003-08 period, 
the average annual growth rate of China’s OFDI was 73% compared to the world average of 
29% (UNCTAD data base).  
Although the world financial crisis significantly cut down the scale of global investments, 
China’s OFDI still achieved an annual growth of 11% in the crisis period 2009-12 (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: China’s OFDI Flow and Stock and IFDI Flow (US$ current prices in billions) 
Source: UNCTAD Statistics, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/.   
Yao and Sutherland (2009), Yao et al. (2010) and Xiao and Sun (2005) have pointed out that a 
distinctive feature of China’s emergence as a major global investor is the country’s national 
“Go Global” strategy. Selected large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are deployed as 
investment vehicles supported with a soft-budget constraint and easy bank credits to realise 
the country’s overseas investment interests, such as securing a long-term and stable supply of 
natural resources at reasonable prices. 
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China has only become a large FDI source country very recently, but it has long been 
acknowledged as an important FDI recipient thanks to its opening up policy adopted in 1979. 
It has been the top host country of IFDI in the developing world since the late 1990s and one 
of the three largest host countries in the world since 2005 (UNCTAD 2007).  
China has invested in both the developed and developing economies with a high 
concentration in Asia, particularly Hong Kong. By the end of 2012, over two-thirds of 
China’s total OFDI went to Asia, with Hong Kong accounting for 57.6% (Table 1).  
Table 1 Key Destinations of China’s OFDI ($ billions), end of 2012 
 
OFDI Stock Share % Rank  
Total 531.9 100.0 
 
Asia 364.4 68.5 
 
   Hong Kong, China 306.4 57.6 1 
   Indonesia 3.1 0.6 13 
   Japan 1.6 0.3 18 
   Macao, China 2.9 0.6 15 
   Singapore 12.4 2.3 6 
   Republic of Korea 3.1 0.6 14 
Africa 21.7 4.1 
 
   Nigeria 2.0 0.4 17 
   South Africa 4.8 0.9 10 
Europe 37.0 7.0 
 
   United Kingdom 8.9 1.7 7 
   Germany 3.1 0.6 12 
   France 4.0 0.7 11 
   Russia 4.9 0.9 9 
Latin America 68.2 12.8 
 
   Cayman Islands 30.1 5.7 3 
   Virgin Is. (E) 30.9 5.8 2 
North America 25.5 4.8 
 
   Canada 5.1 0.9 8 
   United States 17.1 3.2 4 
Oceania 15.1 2.8 
 
   Australia 13.9 2.6 5 
Notes: The values of OFDI stock reported in China Statistical Yearbook are slightly different from those 
reported in UNCTAD Statistics.  
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2013).  
Tax heavens, such as the British Virgin and Cayman Islands are also two of the most 
attractive locations for China’s OFDI. Developed countries, such as the US, Australia, 
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Singapore, Canada and the member states in the EU, have also become popular host countries 
of Chinese capital. Other destinations of China’s OFDI include the developing countries in 
Africa and Latin America. It is interesting that countries with high political risk, for example, 
Sudan, are important hosts of Chinese capital (accounting for 0.2%). In addition, it is notable 
that some of the economies listed in Table 1 are also the top sources of China’s IFDI, such as 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Japan, the US, the UK, Germany and France.   
Table 2 shows the sectoral distribution of China’s OFDI stock. More than 70% of the Chinese 
capital flowed into the services industries, such as leasing and business services, financial 
intermediation; wholesale and retail trades, and transport, storage and post. A few Chinese 
firms have invested in scientific research and the information technology industries. The 
sectoral distribution of China’s OFDI suggests that the country’s MNEs may be regarded as 
market or strategic asset seekers. Resource exploration related industries (mining; production 
and supply of electricity, gas, heat, and water) and agriculture also take a significant share of 
the OFDI stock, suggesting that some Chinese firms are natural resources seekers.  
The sustained growth of China’s OFDI motivates us to examine whether it has self-
perpetuating growth, that is to say, whether existing OFDI stock has a positive feedback on 
future investment and hence adjusts itself towards a long term equilibrium. The similar trends 
in IFDI and OFDI, as well as the destinations of China’s OFDI, encourage us to examine 
whether cumulative FDI from one country to China has also promoted Chinese MNEs to 
invest in that country later on. Finally, the distributions of China’s OFDI across countries and 
sectors make it possible and interesting to examine how it may have been affected by host 
country characteristics. 
8 
 
Table 2 Sectoral distribution of China’s OFDI stock ($ billions), end of 2012 
 
OFDI stock  % 
Total 531.9 100.0 
Leasing and Business Services 175.7 33.0 
Financial Intermediation 96.5 18.1 
Mining 74.8 14.1 
Wholesale and Retail Trades 68.2 12.8 
Manufacturing 34.1 6.4 
Transport, Storage and Post 29.2 5.5 
Construction 12.9 2.4 
Real Estate 9.6 1.8 
Production and Supply of Electricity, Heat, Gas and Water 9.0 1.7 
Scientific Research and Technical Services 6.8 1.3 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery 5.0 0.9 
Software and Information Technology 4.8 0.9 
Service to Households, Repair and Other Services 3.6 0.7 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 0.8 0.2 
Hotels and Catering Services 0.8 0.1 
Education 0.2 0.03 
Management of Water Conservancy, Environment and  0.1 0.01 
Health and Social Service 0.1 0.01 
Notes: The values of OFDI stock reported in China Statistical Yearbook are slightly different from those 
reported in UNCTAD Statistics.  
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2013). 
9 
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Determinants of OFDI 
Some existing empirical studies suggest that market and asset seeking are the main 
motivations of Chinese MNEs going abroad. Due to data availability, earlier studies have 
used the total amount of foreign exchange approved by the government as a measurement of 
Chinese OFDI. Buckley et al. (2007) find that Chinese OFDI was attracted by market size 
and natural resources of host countries during 1984-2001. The results also suggest that 
Chinese OFDI is associated with high political risks in and cultural proximity to host 
countries. Cheung and Qian (2009) also find evidence of both market and resource seeking 
motivations of Chinese OFDI during 1991-2005. They find that Chinese exports to 
developing countries and foreign exchange reserves induce OFDI and Chinese capital 
displays different types of agglomeration behaviour across developed and developing 
economies.  
Using actual OFDI flows during 2003-09, Zhang and Daly (2011) find Chinese OFDI is 
positively related with international trade, market size, GDP growth, openness and resource 
endowment of host countries. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) find Chinese OFDI is attracted to 
large markets and to countries with a combination of rich natural resources and poor 
institutions.  
Ramasamy et al. (2012) combine the data of public listed Chinese MNEs and that of host 
countries during 2006-08 and use the frequency count of Chinese FDI projects in the host 
country as a measurement of OFDI. The findings suggest that state-controlled firms are 
attracted to countries with rich natural resources and unstable political environments, whereas 
private firms are more market seeking oriented.  
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The above studies all investigate the factors in the host countries that attract OFDI from 
China. However, these studies model Chinese OFDI in a comparative static framework. They 
do not take into account the agglomeration effect that considers the self-perpetuating growth 
of OFDI. When examining the determinants of IFDI stock, Cheng and Kwan (2000) states 
that observed FDI stock has a positive feedback on future investment even without the 
influence of other determinants, triggering the gradual adjustment from the actual stock 
towards its equilibrium level. Investment inertia takes time to adjust, and the adjustment 
inevitably incurs costs. In addition, these determinants change over time so the equilibrium 
level is continuously changed. Similarly, Chinese OFDI may also face this dynamic 
adjustment and adjustment cost but this has largely been ignored in the existing literature. 
3.2 IFDI and OFDI 
Exiting studies on FDI usually concentrate on inward or outward FDI individually. The 
relationship between IFDI and OFDI has received some, but limited attention in the literature, 
although this is largely unexplored except a few descriptive studies (Sauvant 2011; Sauwant 
et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2005; Katherin and Cornelia 2007). According to investment 
development path theory (Dunning, 1993), a country only has IFDI at the first stage of 
development. OFDI starts in the second stage and gets stronger in the third stage with 
activities related to market and resources seeking. At the fourth stage of development, OFDI 
is even stronger and with high levels of R&D capacities. The evolution shows that OFDI 
occurs once the country reaches a threshold growth point and when local firms have acquired 
firm-specific advantages that allow them to engage in OFDI. IFDI from developed countries 
provides channels for EMNEs to acquire technology and other firm specific know-how (Fu 
and Zhang, 2011). Firstly, advanced technologies can be transferred to host country firms 
within the joint ventures through imported equipment and labour training. Secondly, 
technologies are transferred through horizontal spillovers to other firms in the same industry 
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through demonstration and labour turnover. Thirdly, vertical sprillovers occur within the 
value chain through linkages with suppliers, distributors and customers. Finally, competition 
effect will force firms to innovate to maintain competitive advantages.  
In terms of empirical studies, Wei (1995), Woo (1995) and Dees (1998) find IFDI affect 
economic growth in China. However, there is mixed evidence for the effect of IFDI on 
productivity and innovation capabilities of local Chinese firms. Buckley et al. (2002) find 
foreign invested firms generate technological spillovers to Chinese firms. Hu and Jefferson 
(2002) find negative short-run spillover effect of FDI in general but its long-run effect 
depends on other factors, such as sector, FDI sharing ownership of local firms, 
competitiveness of local firms, and source country of FDI.  Fu and Gong (2011) find FDI 
contributes to static industry capabilities but its R&D activities have negative effect on 
technological change of local Chinese firms. These studies, to some extent, provide evidence 
of the indirect linkage between IFDI and OFDI.  
Li et al. (2012) provides evidence of direct linkage between IFDI and OFDI associated 
knowledge transfer. They argue that emerging countries like China use OFDI as a substitute 
for acquiring knowledge associated with IFDI.   Therefore, the higher the level of IFDI in an 
industry, the lower positive effect of the host country technology advantage in that industry 
and hence decreases emerging markets to invest in foreign countries for knowledge-seeking.  
To explain the effect of IFDI on OFDI, a couple of studies in business internationalization 
look at the impact of business network on EMNEs overseas investment. Ning and Sutherland 
(2012) argue that, as latecomers of the global production network, EMNEs obtain knowledge 
of foreign markets and enhance capabilities through being the suppliers of mature MNEs 
(through IFDI) in their domestic markets. Then EMNEs are able to engage in OFDI at later 
stages, usually based on their supply relationship with their foreign partners. They find a 
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number of Chinese firms set subsidiaries in other countries to meet the demands of their non-
Chinese MNEs in these markets. Through the close relationships with these non-Chinese 
MNEs, many Chinese-MNEs have internationalized further and become successful MNEs. 
Hertenstein et al. (2015) find that OFDI strategies of Chinese MNEs in the auto components 
industry are shaped by sub-contracting supply relationships established through prior IFDI. 
Prior IFDI by MNEs from developed countries have important home country effect on the 
location choices, strategic asset seeking orientation and pace of internationalization. Within 
business networks, the insidership will help firms reduce uncertainty, increasing learning, 
build trust and exploit more opportunities, and in turn, increase the levels of network 
commitment, all considered crucial for internationalization process. Hertenstein et al. (2015) 
interviewed 5 Chinese auto component suppliers, all of which had significant business 
engagement with other MNEs invested in China prior to investing overseas. Their OFDI 
projects were oriented to enhancing commitment to and benefits from their relationships. 
They usually chose foreign locations close to their MNE partners. It explains why some 
Chinese MNEs invest in physically distant developed countries at the early stage of 
internationalization. They acquire technologies for further commitment to the network 
positions, and in turn their commitment to the network speeded up their expansion in scale, 
international geographical coverage, and complexity of products.   
There have been few economic studies in this area except the following. Apergis (2009) 
conducts simple panel cointegration and panel causality tests on the association between 
OFDI and IFDI, using a dataset for 35 countries in 1981-2004. The results suggest that OFDI 
has a significant long-run relationship with IFDI, indicating that OFDI will enhance growth 
of an economy through the attraction of IFDI which will in turn move the economy onto 
higher growth levels. Mo (2014) links the IFDI-OFDI nexus with entrepreneurial behaviour 
in ten industries over the period 2003-2012 in China. The findings show that IFDI flows is 
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negatively associated with OFDI flows, reflecting that China is entering a mid-late period of 
investment development path with a deceasing trend of IFDI and increasing growth of OFDI 
in the observed period. The results also suggest that IFDI affects China’s entrepreneurship 
and entrepreneurial behaviour affects OFDI. However, Mo (2014) does not consider other 
variables that may have impact on OFDI except IFDI and entrepreneurial indices so that 
missing variable bias might occur in the regression models. Therefore, prior IFDI is 
important for Chinese firms to gain experience and knowledge, understand foreign markets, 
establish business networks, and enhance entrepreneurship, all considered as preconditions 
for taking OFDI projects. It is reasonable to expect that China’s prior IFDI may have 
influence on its OFDI. However, the evidence providing direct evidence of IFDI-OFDI 
relationship is still limited.  
This paper aims to fill the two gaps in the FDI literature by examining the dynamic 
adjustment effect of OFDI and its relationship with IFDI in China.  
4. Methodology, data and model 
The partial stock adjustment model was developed by Chow (1967). Cheng and Kwan (2000) 
and Campos and Kinoshita (2003) have adopted this model when investigating the IFDI path 
towards an equilibrium stock in China and transition economies, respectively. Following 
these studies, we assume that China’s OFDI stock (COFDIS) adjust towards its equilibrium 
(COFDIS*) according to the process expressed in Equation (1).  
)ln(ln * ititit
it COFDISCOFDISCOFDIS
dt
dCOFDIS
                               (1) 
Equation (1) suggests that the rate of growth of OFDI stock depends on two factors. The first 
factor is the quantity of existing stock (COFDISit), which has a positive “self-reinforcing” 
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effect, meaning that the more China invests in a host country, the more it will continue to do 
so in the future. This effect resembles the agglomeration effect of FDI (Head and Ries 1996). 
The second factor is the difference between the equilibrium level (COFDISit*) and the actual 
stock (COFDISit). α is the adjustment speed, taking values between 0 and 1. A higher value 
of α reflects a higher adjustment speed and a smaller adjustment cost, or vice versa. The 
model shows that the self-reinforcing effect diminishes when COFDISit approaches the 
equilibrium level. It implies that China’s overseas investment adjusts gradually rather than 
instantaneously because investment inertia takes time to adjust towards its long term 
equilibrium. The installation of new investment is slowed down by a convex adjustment cost 
whose marginal value increases with capital stock. 
Since it
it
it COFDISd
COFDIS
dCOFDIS
ln , equation (1) can be written as  
)ln(ln
ln *
itit
it COFDISCOFDIS
dt
COFDISd
                         (2) 
We approximate 1lnln  itit
it COFDISCOFDISd
dt
dCOFDIS
, and COFDISit  by COFDISit-1. 
Substituting the above relations into Equation (2) with re-arrangement, we have Equation (3). 
*
1 lnln)1(ln ititit COFDISCOFDISCOFDIS     (3) 
The actual OFDI stock ( ) is presented as a weighted value of its previous stock 
( ) and equilibrium value ( ). Campos and Kinoshita (2003) 
indicate that a positive and less than unity α implies stability.  
The equilibrium stock is assumed to be a function of certain variables. 
itCOFDISln
1,ln tiCOFDIS
*ln itCOFDIS
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ittiitit XCOFDIS  
*ln                 (4) 
Xit is a vector of explanatory variables; μi captures all the unobserved country-specific effects 
that are time unvarying; νt refers to time-specific effects; and εit is a random disturbance. 
Equation (3) implies that equilibrium OFDI stock solely depends on the change in its 
determinants, and is not affected by the adjustment cost. Integrating equation (4) into 
equation (3), a partial stock adjustment model is rewritten in equation (5).  
ittiititit XCOFDISCOFDIS   1ln)1(ln          (5) 
where 𝛼𝜆′ = 𝛽′ and 𝛼𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼𝜐𝑡 + 𝛼𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡.  
The final model can be written as: 
itti
itititit
itititit
it1-itititit
TechnologyResoucesInflationGovernance
OpennessExportsRGDPPCGrowthRGDP
RGDPImportsCIFDISCOFDISCOFDIS







 
1211109
8765
431211
lnlnln_
lnlnlnlnln
 (6) 
where i and t denote host country i and year t, respectively. 
lnCOFDISit-1 is China’s OFDI stock lagged by one year in country i at time t-1.  OFDI stock 
is commonly used in empirical studies to represent the agglomeration effect (Wheeler and 
Mody, 1992; Barrell and Pain, 1999; Cheung and Qian, 2009; Wagner and Timmins, 2009). 
Cheng and Kwan (2000) argue that the implications of including lagged FDI stock were 
threefold. Firstly, it functions as an agglomeration effect, generating ‘positive feedback’ and 
externalities so that further investments would be self-reinforced. Secondly, it is associated 
with an adjustment process, as illustrated in the above partial stock adjustment model. 
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Thirdly, it is helpful to calculate the unobservable equilibrium stock. A positive and less than 
unity  supports the self-reinforcement effect and the dynamic adjustment of China’s OFDI. 
According to the literature, prior IFDI might have influence on OFDI and the home country 
effect is important for the OFDI location choice, we have lnCIFDISi,t-1 which means the 
previous stock of IFDI from country i at time t-1 in China. There are two reasons to use the 
lagged stock value to capture potential externality. Firstly, Driffield and Love (2003) also 
argue that the stock of IFDI rather than its flow is more likely to include cumulative 
knowledge. Similarly, it can be assumed that IFDI stock takes time to generate externality 
(including knowledge, experience, business networks establishment, entrepreneurship etc.) 
and it also takes time for IFDI to have an effect on OFDI. There are many restrictions to 
prohibit this externality generation. However, they diminish over time. Therefore, IFDI stock 
is more likely to generate positive externality to promote OFDI. Secondly, the lagged value is 
introduced to avoid any spurious correlation. Oulton (1996) and Driffield and Love (2003) 
demonstrate that using lagged IFDI can tightly define spillovers. It is less likely that 
contemporaneous residuals will relate to previous IFDI and hence the estimation is not 
spurious. If we use the contemporaneous value of IFDI stock, unobserved factors left in the 
error term may simultaneously affect contemporaneous IFDI and OFDI. They may take the 
form of a common shock, though. For example, the liberalisation of foreign economic policy 
may simultaneously stimulate IFDI and OFDI. Overall, one-year lagged values of IFDI stock 
are introduced to present the correlation between China’s IFDI and OFDI. However, we also 
noted that the lagged IFDI stock variable is an aggregate measure of IFDI which does not 
allow us to understand the mechanisms through which the effect takes place. It does not allow 
us to look at the effect which might vary across, for example, sector and entry mode of IFDI. 
is expected to be positive, signifying a positive association and implying that China’s 
1
2
17 
 
previous stock of IFDI promotes its contemporaneous OFDI stock. lnImportst-1 is the value of 
imports lagged by one period from host countries. It is added to control the effect of previous 
IFDI on contemporaneous OFDI. As another potential source to generate externality, the 
lagged value is also introduced to avoid spurious correlation.  
The remaining control variables are similar to those used in Yao and Wang (2014). Real GDP 
(lnRGDP) and annual growth rate of real GDP (RGDP_Growth) represent economic masses 
(Yeaple, 2003; Hanson et al., 2001; Buckley et al., 2007). Larger GDP and faster economic 
growth imply bigger markets and more opportunities. Therefore, positive coefficients for 
these two control variables are expected.  
Real GDP per capita (RGDPPC) capture the income level of the host countries and its impact 
on China’s OFDI can be ambiguous. On the one hand, income may reflect the quality of 
domestic labour. A high income usually implies high labour productivity and has a positive 
effect on China’s OFDI. On the other hand, it also reflects the cost of operation in the host 
country. High income implies high cost and has a negative effect on China’s OFDI. The net 
effect of host country income depends on the interaction between its positive effect as a 
measurement of labour productivity and its negative effect as wages cost. 
Bilateral exports (Exports) could be either substitution or complementarity to OFDI.  
Internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976) and horizontal FDI theory (Markusen, 
1984) support a substitution relationship, while vertical FDI theory (Helpman, 1984) sustains 
a complementary relationship. Empirically, it has been examined by using both aggregate and 
disaggregate data at country level (Grubert and Mutti, 1991), industry level (Brainard, 1997), 
firm level (Head and Ries, 2001) and product level (Blonigen, 2001). Given China’s export-
oriented economy and the close relation between OFDI and exports, a positive coefficient is 
expected. 
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The effect of trade openness (Openness) is also controversial. On the one hand, higher level 
of openness in the host country would attract more foreign investment and has a positive 
effect on OFDI. On the other hand, it is negatively associated with trade barriers of the host 
country. If China were to conduct OFDI in a high trade barriers country because of the ‘tariff-
jumping’ motivation, this may have a negative effect on OFDI.  
Governance quality of the host country (Governance) is measured by the World Bank’s Index 
of Control of Corruption published in The Worldwide Governance Indicators (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002) and the Political Risk Index from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
A higher value implies a lower degree of corruption, and hence better governance. The effect 
of governance on FDI is ambiguous. On the one hand, good governance reduces the risks of 
uncertainty and make the host country more attractive (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; 
Blonigen, 2005; Cole, et al. 2009). On the other hand, a number of studies suggest that China 
is more experienced in dealing with an opaque business environment than its Western rivals 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Mock et al., 2008) so Chinese firms tend to be attracted to 
countries with poor institutions (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009).  
The impact of inflation (Inflation) on Chinese OFDI is also included, similar to Kolstad and 
Wiig (2009). High inflation would discourage FDI because high economic instability and low 
real profit would limit market-seeking FDI (Buckley et al. 2007). High inflation devalues the 
local currency and discourages export-oriented FDI as well. Therefore, a negative sign is 
expected. 
Host country’s overall natural resource endowment (Resources) examines whether China’s 
OFDI is motivated by natural resource-seeking. Following Cheung and Qian (2009) and 
Zhang (2009), the share of fuels, ores and metal exports as a proportion in total merchandise 
exports is used to represent the overall natural resource endowment of a host country. Host 
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country’s technology level (Technology) tests the existence of technology-seeking (or 
strategic asset-seeking) motivation of Chinese OFDI.  It is measured by the share of high-
technology product exports in manufactured exports.  
The year dummy (φt) is included to control for macro-economic effects on all the host 
countries. The host country dummy (ϕi) is included to capture all the time-constant 
unobserved country heterogeneities. ξit is an error term. 
The definition and data sources of variables discussed above are provided in Appendix A. 
The data allows us to examine the factors influencing China’s OFDI stock in 172 host 
countries during 2003–09. A list of host countries is reported in Appendix B. The cleaned 
dataset includes 1,110 observations and accounts for 84% of China’s initial total OFDI stock 
value. Table 3 reports the summary statistics of all the variables. Figure 2 reveals the 
relationship between a host country’s IFDI stock lagged by one period in China and its 
contemporaneous OFDI stock in that host country.  
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Table 3: Summary statistics 2003–09 (7 years, 172 host countries) 
Variable Obs. Mean Standard Difference Minimum Maximum 
lnCOFDIS 1110 2.716  2.550  -4.605  12.011  
lnCOFDISt-1 939 2.521  2.521  -4.605  11.660  
lnCIFDISt-1 958 4.625  3.073  -3.912  13.754  
lnImportst-1 966 4.773  3.561  -6.908  11.924  
lnRGDP 1134 9.679  2.332  4.751  16.261  
RGDP_Growth 1146 0.046  0.053  -0.413  0.465  
lnRGDPPC 1134 7.823  1.643  4.419  11.326  
lnExports 1160 6.183  2.419  -1.666  12.440  
lnOpenness 1088 -0.422  0.731  -12.482  2.777  
Governance 1195 0.499  0.205  0.104  1.025  
Inflation 1061 0.311  7.502  -0.132  244.110  
Resources 873 0.255  0.286  0.000  0.997  
Technology 885 0.101  0.129  0.000  0.997  
Notes: Obs. = number of observations. Values are measured in current prices in $ million (lnCOFDIS, 
lnCOFDISt-1, lnCIFDISt-1, lnImportst-1, lnExports), in 2000 prices in $ million (lnRGDP, lnRGDPPC), and in 
percentages (RGDP_Growth, Governance, Inflation, Resources, Technology, lnOpenness). Please see Appendix 
A for variable definitions.  
Figure 2: Relation between China’s IFDI and OFDI stocks 
 
Notes: Logarithms of China’s annual IFDI and OFDI were calculated by the authors.  
Data sources: MOFCOM (2009) and NBS (2007, 2010). 
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There are several econometric issues related to the dynamic model of Equation (6). Firstly, 
the lagged dependent variable is not strictly exogenous as it may be correlated with the 
disturbance (Greene, 2002). An instrumental variable approach is adopted to avoid this 
problem. Secondly, the unobserved host country fixed effects, such as geography and 
demography, may be correlated with the dependent variable. Thirdly, we have a small N 
(short time periods T=7) and large N (many host countries N=172) panel data. To solve these 
problems, we use the system GMM developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Comparing with the difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991), the system GMM 
obtains a system of two equations, one in levels and one in first differences. More 
instruments can be obtained and the variables in levels are instrumented with their own first 
differences (e.g. ∆lnCOFDISit-1 is an instrument for lnCOFDISit-1). Therefore, the system 
GMM is more efficient than the difference GMM. However, the system GMM assumes that 
the first difference instruments used for the variables in levels are not correlated with the 
fixed effects (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This assumption depends on the steady state and 
could be examined by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (Roodman 2006). A 
less than unity value is expected; otherwise the system GMM is not valid. To detect the 
autocorrelation aside from the fixed effects in levels, we look for the second order correlation 
AR(2) in differences. The existence of autocorrelation indicates that the lags of the variables 
are endogeneous and thus are not proper instruments. To test the joint validity of the 
instruments set and subsets, we use Hansen J test and difference-in-Hansen test.  
Baltagi (2008) argues that system GMM reduces the finite-sample bias and the estimations 
are consistent and more efficient than other dynamic panel estimations. The system GMM 
estimation uses a two-step robust regression to correct the finite-sample bias (Windmeijer, 
2005). Bond (2002) and Roodman (2006) indicate that ordinary least square (OLS) and fixed 
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effects (FE) estimations for a dynamic panel are biased. However, they provide a good check 
on the validity of GMM estimation by providing the upper and lower bounds, respectively. 
OLS overestimates the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable because it is positively 
correlated with errors (Hsiao, 1986) and the FE estimations underestimate the coefficient in a 
short panel (Nickell, 1981). The validity of system GMM estimation is assured if , the 
coefficient of lagged dependent variable, lies between the estimations of OLS and FE. 
Therefore, the results of using OLS and FE estimations are also reported.   
1
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5 Results and discussions 
5.1 Baseline Results 
The baseline results are reported in Table 4 for the whole sample. Column (1) presents the 
OLS regression results without controlling for the country-specific effects. Column (2) 
presents the FE (fixed effect) regression results by controlling for the country-specific effects. 
Column (3) presents the system GMM regression results by treating lnCOFDISt-1 as 
endogenous. The coefficient of China’s OFDI stock lagged by one period is less than unity, 
indicating the validity of the system GMM estimation. The value of the estimated coefficient 
0.649 lies comfortably below the corresponding upper bound of OLS estimation, 0.790, and 
above the corresponding lower bound of FE estimation, 0.326, providing additional evidence 
of valid estimation.  
The validity of system GMM hinges on statistical diagnostics. The F test rejects the null 
hypothesis and the joint significance is supported. The rejection of the Arellano–Bond AR(1) 
test and the failure to reject the AR(2) test indicate that the transformed equation does not 
serially correlate at the second order, implying that the model is correctly specified. The 
failure to reject the Hansen test confirms the overall validity of the augmented instruments. 
The failure to reject the difference-in-Hansen test confirms the validity of the subset 
instruments. 
In column (3), the coefficient of the lagged Chinese OFDI stock is positive and significant at 
the 1% level. A 10% rise in the lagged OFDI stock in a host country is associated with an 
increase in the current OFDI stock by 6.5%. The result supports the agglomeration effect of 
OFDI and provides evidence that the positive feedback and self-reinforcement effect of 
China’s past investments drive its current investments in the same direction. This finding is 
consistent with the result of Cheung and Qian (2009). More importantly, the significance of 
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the lagged dependent variable strongly supports the dynamic adjustment of China’s OFDI. 
This will be discussed later.  
The results provide evidence that a country’s historic FDI stock in China motivates its OFDI 
stock in that country at the 10% significance level. A 10% rise in the lagged IFDI stock from 
a host country (lnIFDISit-1) will lead to 1% increase in the current OFDI stock in that country, 
ceteris paribus. This finding confirms the positive externality of IFDI stock through 
information and knowledge spillovers, as well as the commitment to and benefits from 
business networks.  
The results for the other explanatory variables have expected signs and significance. The 
coefficient on real GDP per capita is negative and significant, indicating that Chinese MNEs 
care more about the costs of operating business rather than labour productivity. This finding 
is consistent with the results in Cheng and Ma (2007) and Zhang (2009). Chinese investors 
prefer the host countries where China exports more goods and services. This finding 
corroborates a complementary relationship between OFDI and exports. It is also consistent 
with previous studies on China’s OFDI (Buckley et al, 2007; Cheung and Qian, 2009; Zhang, 
2009), as well as the argument that China’s OFDI is largely distributed in the trade-related 
sectors. The result of Resources indicates that Chinese OFDI is more likely to be attracted by 
countries with rich natural resources and confirms the resources-seeking motivation of 
Chinese OFDI (Buckley et al, 2007; Cheung and Qian, 2009). 
The results of real GDP and real GDP growth are not significant, meaning there is no 
evidence of market-seeking motivations of Chinese MNEs for the whole sample. The 
insignificant result of technology does not support the technology-seeking or strategic asset-
seeking motivations of Chinese MNEs. The effects of China’s lagged imports from the host 
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country and host country’s openness, governance, and inflation are not statistically different 
from zero.    
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Table 4: Estimation results for the whole sample 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
lnCOFDIS OLS   FE   System GMM 
lnCOFDISt-1 0.790***  0.326***  0.649*** 
 (0.035)  (0.073)  (0.109)    
lnCIFDISt-1 0.074***  -0.024  0.098*   
 (0.020)  (0.058)  (0.052)    
lnImportst-1 0.034  -0.007  0.026    
 (0.029)  (0.065)  (0.035)    
lnRGDP -0.056  -0.194  -0.089    
 (0.063)  (2.074)  (0.108)    
RGDP_Growth 0.031  0.748  0.398    
 (0.880)  (1.244)  (1.112)    
lnRGDPPC -0.137**  -0.917  -0.243**  
 (0.055)  (2.134)  (0.106)    
lnExports 0.164***  0.055  0.279**  
 (0.061)  (0.190)  (0.115)    
lnOpenness 0.057  0.118  -0.022    
 (0.105)  (0.246)  (0.211)    
Governance 0.042  2.854  0.066    
 (0.340)  (1.880)  (0.531)    
Inflation -0.104  -0.400  0.006    
 (0.084)  (0.941)  (0.140)    
Resources 0.639***  -0.240  0.804*** 
 (0.185)  (0.860)  (0.273)    
Technology -0.660**  0.301  -0.202    
 (0.314)  (0.616)  (0.459)    
Country dummy No  Yes  Yes 
Year dummy Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of obs. 554  554  554 
F statistic 252.80  33.51  80.31 
AR(1) test     0.001 
AR(2) test     0.508 
Hansen J test     0.570 
Difference-in-Hansen     0.385 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
lnCOFDISt-1 is endogenous; the levels dated t-2 and earlier are instruments for the transformed equation and the 
differences dated t-1 are instruments for the level equation. The F statistic examines the joint significance. The 
Arellano–Bond AR(1) and AR(2) test examines whether the transformed equation is serially correlated at the 
first order and second order, respectively. The Hansen test examines the over-identification restriction for 
system GMM estimation. The difference-in-Hansen test examines the validity of instrument subsets in the level 
equation. p values are shown for AR(1), AR(2), Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests. Please see Appendix A 
for variable definitions. 
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5.2 Actual and Equilibrium Stocks of OFDI 
The partial stock adjustment model enables us to restore the unobserved equilibrium stock 
and to compare it with the actual level. The adjustment process can be written as Equation (7). 
)ln)1((ln
1
ln 1
*
 itit COFDISCOFDISCOFDIS it 
 (7) 
The coefficient on lnCOFDISit-1 (i.e. 1 – α) suggests that the speed of adjustment is α = 1 - 
0.649 = 0.351. If the above steady state of China’s OFDI stock holds, it will take about 1/α = 
1/0.351≈3 years to close the gap between the equilibrium and the actual stocks. This gradual 
adjustment reflects the effect of adjustment cost.  
Using Equation (7), we calculate the equilibrium stock of Chinese OFDI. Cheng and Kwan 
(2000) argue that the changes in equilibrium stock reflect the influences of policy and 
exogenous variables without the intervention of the adjustment costs and the self-reinforcing 
effect; and the difference between the actual and equilibrium stocks reflects the potential of 
the host country in attracting further FDI from China.   
To examine the difference between the equilibrium and the actual stocks, we use the same 
approach in Cheng and Kwan (2000) to calculate the median and median annual growth of 
the equilibrium OFDI stock and compare them with those of the actual level (Figures 3 and 4). 
The findings are threefold. Firstly, the equilibrium stock is always bigger than the actual 
stock in Figure 3, implying that the real OFDI stock was underinvested in general so that 
Chinese OFDI had huge potential to expand continuously. Secondly, the subprime crisis in 
2007 did not have a significant impact on China’s OFDI. The median of equilibrium and the 
median of actual stock remained stable in 2008 and increased in 2009, indicating that China’s 
28 
 
reintegration within the world economy through overseas investments was a long-term 
strategy and it was not fundamentally altered by a short-term shock.  
Figure 3: Medians of equilibrium and actual stock of China’s OFDI 
 
Notes: The median of the equilibrium stock is calculated by the authors. 
Data sources: MOFCOM (2009). 
 
Figure 4: Annual growth rates of medians 
 
Notes: The annual growth rates of medians are calculated by the authors. 
Data source: MOFCOM (2009). 
 
Finally and most importantly, the equilibrium stock was relatively more volatile than the 
actual level. The subprime crisis had a stronger negative impact on the equilibrium stock than 
on the actual level. The equilibrium stock is estimated in the absence of the self-reinforcing 
effect and adjustment cost, thus it responds faster to an exogenous change. Investment inertia 
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and adjustment cost slow down the responses of actual stock to exogenous changes. There are 
various sources for the adjustment cost: the time-to-plan (Christiano and Todd, 1996) and the 
time-to-build (Casares, 2002). For example, China’s overseas investments have to be 
approved, registered, and supervised by a series of government departments. Such 
bureaucratic procedure takes time and slows down investment decisions. 
To explore the potential of the host country to attract more Chinese capital, we follow Cheng 
and Kwan (2000) and calculate the dispersion between the actual and the equilibrium stocks, 
i.e. the logarithm of the ratio of the actual stock over its equilibrium as illustrated by the box 
plots in Figure 5. The figure shows negative median logarithmic values, indicating that the 
actual OFDI stock in the host country is underinvested. More importantly, the overtime 
shrinking dispersions and the stable median implies a trend of relative convergence between 
the actual and equilibrium stocks. On average, a host country tends to exploit its potential to 
attract China’s investments and the existing investment stock adjusts towards its equilibrium 
level. This convergence will be more clearly revealed in the following split samples.  
 
Figure 5: Difference between actual and equilibrium OFDI stocks 
 
Notes: OFDIS is actual OFDI stock. OFDIS* is the equilibrium stock calculated by the 
authors. Outside values are excluded.  
Data source: MOC (2009). 
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5.3 Results by Host Country’s Characteristics 
To examine whether the dynamic adjustment of China’s OFDI and the effect of China’s IFDI 
vary with host country’s characteristics, we split the whole sample according to their 
technology level, natural resource endowment and income.1 The results using the system 
GMM estimations are reported in Table 5, which shows that all the specifications pass the 
tests in all split samples. In particular, the coefficient of lagged China’s OFDI stock is less 
than unity and the steady-state assumption is held. It also lies comfortably below the 
corresponding upper bound of OLS estimation and above the corresponding lower bound of 
FE estimation (see Appendix C for the OLS and FE results).  
Table 5: System GMM results by host country’s characteristics  
   Technology  Natural resources Income level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lnCOFDIS   High Low Abundant 
Less 
Abundant High Low 
lnCOFDISt-1  0.628*** 0.385**  0.470*** 0.524*** 0.614*** 0.657*** 
(1-α)  (0.133) (0.163) (0.126) (0.130)    (0.137) (0.138) 
lnCIFDISt-1  0.158** 0.140*   0.026 0.159    0.177*** 0.017   
  (0.074) (0.077)    (0.050) (0.102)    (0.064) (0.026)    
Country dummy   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Speed of adjustment α  0.372 0.615 0.530 0.476 0.386 0.343 
Year of adjustment 
1/α  3 2 2 2 3 3 
Number of obs.  302 252    280 274    347 207    
F statistic  48.27 23.73    28.29 27.24    51.25 76.69    
AR(1) test  0.014   0.060    0.027 0.015 0.005 0.006 
AR(2) test  0.750   0.259    0.577 0.624 0.666 0.938 
Hansen J test  0.515   0.780    0.159 0.218 0.545 0.264 
Difference-in-Hansen   0.439   0.605 0.224 0.154 0.395 0.328 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
lnCOFDISt-1 is endogenous; the levels dated t-2 and earlier are instruments for the transformed equation and the 
differences dated t-1 are instruments for the level equation. The F statistic examines the joint significance. The 
Arellano–Bond AR(1) and AR(2) test examines whether the transformed equation is serially correlated at the 
first order and second order, respectively. The Hansen test examines the over-identification restriction for 
system GMM estimation. The difference-in-Hansen test examines the validity of instrument subsets in the level 
equation. p values are shown for AR(1), AR(2), Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests. The results of other 
variables are available upon request. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. 
                                                 
1 A host country is classified as a high-technology country if the value of Technology variable exceeds the 
median value; otherwise, it is a low-technology country. A country is defined as natural resource abundant if its 
value of Resource variable exceeds the median value, or vice versa. Similarly, A country is high income if its 
real GDP per capita exceeds the median value, and vice versa. 
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The results for high- and low-technology host countries are presented in columns (1) and (2) 
in Table 5, respectively. The coefficients on China’s OFDI stock lagged by one period are 
positive and significant at the 5% level or below. The agglomeration effect of lagged OFDI is 
strong in both subsamples but is bigger in the high-tech host countries. The speed of 
adjustment is lower in high-tech countries (0.372) than that in low-tech ones (0.615), 
indicating a higher adjustment cost in the former than in the latter. For example, the set-up 
cost in high-tech countries may be higher for Chinese MNEs in conducting a new investment 
such as employing skilled labour and experts. If the steady state of China’s OFDI stock holds, 
it will take about 3 and 2 years to close the gap between the equilibrium and actual stocks in 
the two split samples, respectively.  
Figure 6 presents the medians of the equilibrium and actual stocks of China’s OFDI for both 
the high- and low-tech host countries. The equilibrium stock is greater in the high-tech 
countries than in the low-tech ones. One possible explanation is that technology-seeking 
motivation tends to drive China’s OFDI to high-tech host countries but it requires time to do 
so. Wang and Blomstrom (1992) explicitly point out that, although technology spillovers are 
intrinsic, they do not take effect automatically. The more learning investments are conducted 
by a technologically inferior company in absorbing advanced technology, the higher is the 
transfer rate of technology spillovers to active investors. Therefore, China’s final OFDI stock 
in high-tech host countries might be higher. We also find the equilibrium stock is more 
volatile than the actual stock in both split samples. Interestingly, the difference between the 
equilibrium and actual stocks in the high-tech countries is generally greater than that in the 
low-tech ones, which is consistent with the slower adjustment speed and higher adjustment 
cost of Chinese OFDI in the former than in the latter.  
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Figure 6: Median of equilibrium/actual OFDI stocks in high-/low-tech countries 
 
Notes: The median of the equilibrium stock is calculated by the authors. 
Data source: MOFCOM (2009). 
 
Figure 7 shows the deviations of China’s actual OFDI stock from its equilibrium levels in 
both subsamples. The negative medians imply that China’s OFDI is underinvested in the two 
subsamples. The smaller median in high-tech countries implies that China’s investments there 
have greater potential than in the low-tech economies. 
Figure 7: Differences between actual and equilibrium stocks in high- and low-technology 
countries  
 
Notes: OFDIS is China’s actual OFDI stock. OFDIS* is the equilibrium stock calculated by the authors. Outside 
values are excluded.  
Data source: MOFCOM (2009). 
Furthermore, we also find the overtime shrinking dispersion of the difference between 
China’s actual and equilibrium OFDI stocks plus a stable median in both split samples in 
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which is in line with the above findings of slow adjustment speed of actual stock towards its 
equilibrium level in the former than in the latter.   
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 are the results for natural resource abundant and less abundant 
countries, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) respectively report the results for high and low 
income countries. The coefficients on the lagged Chinese OFDI stock in all columns are 
significant and positive. The speed of adjustment or the number of years to close the gap 
between the equilibrium and the actual stocks are similar between columns (3) and (4), as 
well as between columns (5) and (6).   
Figures 8-9 show the medians of, and the dispersion between, the actual and the equilibrium 
stocks in the resource rich and poor countries, Figures 10-11 show the corresponding values 
in the high- and low-income countries. 
 
Figure 8: Medians of China’s equilibrium and actual OFDI stocks in resources abundant and 
less abundant countries 
 
Notes: The median of the equilibrium stock is calculated by the authors. 
Data source: MOFCOM (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
L
o
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
C
h
in
a'
s 
O
F
S
I 
S
to
ck
Median of Equilibrium Stock, Abundant Resources Country
Median of Equilibrium Stock, Less Abundant Resources Country
Median of Actual Stock, Abundant Resouces Country
Median of Actual Stock, Less Abundant Resources Country
34 
 
Figure 9: Differences between actual and equilibrium stocks in resources abundant and less 
abundant countries  
 
Notes: OFDIS is China’s actual OFDI stock. OFDIS* is the equilibrium stock calculated by 
the authors. Outside values are excluded.  
Data source: MOFCOM (2009). 
 
Figure 10: Medians of China’s equilibrium and actual OFDI stocks in high-and low-income 
countries 
 
 
Notes: The median of the equilibrium stock is calculated by the authors. 
Data source: MOFCOM (2009) 
 
Figure 11: Differences between actual and equilibrium stocks in high- and low-income 
countries  
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Notes: OFDIS is China’s actual OFDI stock. OFDIS* is the equilibrium stock calculated by 
the authors. Outside values are excluded.  
Data source: MOC (2009). 
 
The results are consistent with those in the previous sections. The equilibrium stock was 
always more volatile than the actual level in all split samples. The difference between the 
equilibrium and actual stocks in resources rich countries was similar to that in resource poor 
ones, so is that between the high- and low-income countries. 
These findings confirm the similar adjustment speeds (or adjustment costs) in both groups. 
China’s OFDI was underinvested in all subsamples so host countries have potential to attract 
more Chinese FDI, irrespective of their resource endowment or level of economic 
development. There is a relative convergence in terms of actual stock to its equilibrium level 
in all subsamples, and similar dispersions.  
Finally, the lagged IFDI stock has a positive and significant effect on contemporaneous 
Chinese OFDI stock in both high- and low-tech countries, while its impact is not statistically 
different from zero in countries with either abundant or less abundant resources. Given the 
spillover effects of IFDI are largely generated in manufacturing industries, the spilled 
information about host country technology is relevant to China’s future investment in these 
countries while the spilled information about host country natural resources might not be 
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relevant. We also find that the more previous investment in China from high income 
countries the more Chinese investment will flow back there, while such an effect is not 
significant for low income countries. One possible explanation is that consumer demand in 
high-income countries is more diversified, and the spilled information might include 
consumer preferences. For example, the US is one of top IFDI source countries in China. The 
accumulated investments from the US might provide an opportunity for China to better 
understand consumer preferences in the American market, and hence promote subsequent 
Chinese investments. The investment of Haier in the US to design and produce fridges and to 
quickly become a leading brand is a successful case in point. Overall, we find some evidence 
to support the positive association between China’s IFDI and OFDI across all specifications.  
5.4 Robustness Checks 
We also undertake a range of robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of the findings. We 
used the levels dated t-2 and earlier as instruments for the transformed equation in the system 
GMM estimations, the results do not alter the signs and significance of the main variables of 
interest. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are also similar. To further correct the 
skewness to tax havens and offshore financial centres that may affect the actual volume of 
China’s OFDI stock, we drop Hong Kong and Macao from the sample. Thus the round-
tripping investment (Wong and Chan, 2003; Xiao, 2004) to these two SARs is excluded. The 
results are robust across all specifications.  We also drop 4 observations with extremely high 
governance indexes, but the results are similar to the main results reported in the text.  
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6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the dynamic adjustment of China’s OFDI and its relation to IFDI, using 
a panel dataset for China’s OFDI stock in 172 host countries during 2003-09. To our best 
knowledge, this is the first study using a partial stock adjustment model to study China’s 
overseas investment behaviour in a dynamic framework. The partial stock adjustment model 
enables us to restore the unobservable equilibrium OFDI stock value. The comparison 
between the actual and the equilibrium stocks sheds light on the potential of China’s OFDI 
from a new dimension. In addition, this paper reveals the link between China’s IFDI and 
OFDI, which has yet to be examined systematically in existing studies. It further investigates 
whether and how the dynamic adjustment of China’s OFDI and the effect of China’s IFDI 
vary with host country characteristics including technology, resources and income.  
The findings reveal strong evidence for the dynamic adjustment of China’s OFDI and the 
agglomeration and self-reinforcement effect. The significance of dynamic adjustment reveals 
the existence of a substantial adjustment cost in China’s OFDI and implies that the existing 
stock gradually adjusts towards its equilibrium level. The results indicate that the restored 
equilibrium is not only bigger but also more volatile than the actual stock. The findings also 
suggest that the host country, on average, exploits its potential to attract China’s future 
investments. There is some evidence for the positive association between China’s lagged 
IFDI and its contemporaneous OFDI. In addition, the dynamic adjustment of China’s OFDI 
and the agglomeration effect are both stronger in high-technology countries than in low-
technology ones. In contrast, they do not vary with the host country’s natural resources and 
income levels. There is some evidence of a positive relation for high-income countries, but 
not for low-income ones, and the correlation is not conditional on the host country 
technology level. 
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The present study has two implications. Firstly, the existence of adjustment cost constrains 
the potential of China’s OFDI, and a further liberalisation of the approval regime would be 
helpful in reducing the adjustment cost. Secondly, the Chinese government should provide 
more information about host countries, as this valuable information would help Chinese 
MNEs to better understand the foreign market and to respond faster to future investment 
opportunities. As for host countries, it implies that it is imperative to understand the Chinese 
political and economic system better if you wish to attract more Chinese capital. 
The dataset used in this study has two limitations. Firstly, the aggregate measure of IFDI 
stock cannot reflect the mechanisms through which the externality effect takes place or 
explain the difference between sectors. Secondly, the OFDI stock data was collected from 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) that only reported OFDI stock in non-financial sectors 
over the period 2003-2006; therefore, it might lead to the underestimation of equilibrium 
stocks of OFDI.  
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Appendix A: Variables description and data sources  
 
Variables  Description  Data Sources 
lnCOFDIS  value of China’s OFDI stock, in 
$ million and logarithm 
 Ministry of Commerce of China, 
2009 Statistical Bulletin of 
China’s OFDI  
     
lnCOFDISt-1  The above variable lagged by one 
year 
 as above 
     
lnCIFDISt-1  China’s IFDI lagged by one year 
in $ million and logarithm 
 National Bureau of Statistics 
(2007, 2010) China Trade and 
External Economic Statistical 
Yearbook 
 
     
lnImportst-1  China’s imports of goods and 
services from a host country in 
current US million dollars and  
logarithm  
 IMF, Direction of Trade 
     
lnRGDP  real GDP at constant 2000 price, 
$ million in logarithm 
 World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
     
RGDP_Growth  annual growth rate of real GDP  as above 
     
lnRGDPPC  real GDP per capita in logarithm  as above 
     
lnExports  China’s exports of goods and 
services to a host country in 
current US million dollars and 
logarithm 
 IMF, Direction of Trade 
     
lnOpenness  Trade/GDP, in logarithm  World Bank,  World 
Development Indicators 
     
Governance  control of corruption and a higher 
value indicates a low degree of 
corruption 
 World Bank (2010), The 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
     
 
Inflation  ratio of annual inflation rate  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
     
Resources  share of fuels, ores & metals 
exports in merchandise exports 
 as above 
     
Technology  share of high-technology exports 
in manufactured exports 
 as above 
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Appendix B: List of Host Countries 
 
1 Afghanistan 44 Djibouti 87 Liberia 130 Rwanda 
2 Albania 45 Dominica 88 Libyan 131 
Saint Vincent & 
Grenadines 
3 Algeria 46 East Timor 89 Liechtenstein 132 Samoa 
4 Angola 47 Ecuador 90 Lithuania 133 Saudi Arabia 
5 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
48 Egypt 91 Luxembourg 134 Senegal 
6 Argentina 49 
Equator 
Guinea 
92 Macau 135 Serbia 
7 Armenia 50 Eritrea 93 Macedonia 136 Seychelles 
8 Australia 51 Estonia 94 Madagascar 137 Sierra Leone 
9 Austria 52 Ethiopia 95 Malawi 138 Singapore 
10 Azerbaijan 53 Fiji 96 Malaysia 139 Slovakia 
11 Bahamas 54 Finland  97 Mali 140 Slovenia 
12 Bahrain 55 France 98 Malta 141 South Africa 
13 Bangladesh 56 Gabon 99 Marshall 142 South Korea 
14 Barbados 57 Gambia 100 Mauritania 143 Spain 
15 Belarus 58 Georgia 101 Mauritius 144 Sri Lanka 
16 Belgium 59 Germany 102 Mexico 145 Sudan 
17 Belize  60 Ghana 103 Micronesia 146 Suriname 
18 Benin 61 Greece 104 Moldova 147 Sweden 
19 Bermuda 62 Grenada 105 Mongolia 148 Switzerland 
20 Bolivia 63 Guinea 106 Montenegro 149 Syrian Arab Rep 
21 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
64 Guyana 107 Morocco 150 Taiwan 
22 Botswana 65 Honduras 108 Mozambique 151 Tajikistan 
23 Brazil 66 Hong Kong 109 Myanmar 152 Tanzania 
24 Brunei 67 Hungary 110 Namibia 153 Thailand 
25 Bulgaria 68 Iceland 111 Nepal 154 Togo 
26 Burundi 69 India 112 Netherlands 155 Tonga 
27 Cambodia 70 Indonesia 113 New Zealand 156 Trinidad and Tobago 
28 Cameroon 71 Iran 114 Niger 157 Tunisia 
29 Canada 72 Iraq 115 Nigeria 158 Turkey 
30 Cape Verde 73 Ireland 116 North Korea 159 Turkmenistan 
31 
Central African 
Republic 
74 Israel 117 Norway 160 Uganda 
32 Chad 75 Italy 118 Oman 161 Ukraine 
33 Chile 76 Jamaica 119 Pakistan 162 United Arab Emirates 
34 Colombia 77 Japan 120 Palau 163 United Kingdom 
35 Comoros 78 Jordan 121 Panama 164 United States 
36 Congo 79 Kazakhstan  122 Papua New 
Guinea 
165 Uruguay 
37 Congo DR 80 Kenya 123 Paraguay 166 Uzbekistan 
38 Côte d'Ivoire 81 Kuwait 124 Philippines 167 Vanuatu 
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39 Croatia 82 Kyrgyz 125 Poland 168 Venezuela 
40 Cuba 83 Laos 126 Portugal 169 Vietnam 
41 Cyprus 84 Latvia 127 Qatar 170 Yemen 
42 Czech 85 Lebanon 128 Romania 171 Zambia 
43 Denmark 86 Lesotho 129 Russia 172 Zimbabwe 
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Appendix C OLS and FE Results by Host Country’s Characteristics  
 
 
  OLS  FE 
Dependen
t:   Technology  
Natural resources Income level 
 Technology  
Natural resources Income level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
lnCOFDI
S   High Low 
Abunda
nt 
Less 
Abunda
nt High Low  High Low 
Abunda
nt 
Less 
Abunda
nt High Low 
lnCOFDI
St-1  
0.819**
* 
0.755**
* 
0.688**
* 
0.843**
* 
0.791**
* 
0.693**
*  
0.383**
* 
0.258**
* 
0.202**
* 
0.461**
* 
0.352**
* 
0.188*
* 
  (0.043) (0.055) (0.055) (0.046) (0.045) (0.072)  (0.133) (0.094) (0.069) (0.133) (0.098) (0.084) 
               
lnCIFDISt
-1  
0.096**
* 
0.070**
* 0.041 0.034 
0.121**
* 0.029  -0.053 -0.004 -0.101* 0.097 -0.098 0.021 
  (0.036) (0.022) (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) (0.022)  (0.113) (0.075) (0.054) (0.120) (0.159) (0.051) 
Country 
dummy   No No No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control 
variables   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number 
of obs.  302 252 280 274 347 207  302 252 280 274 347 207 
F statistic  200.50 76.17 145.20 226.80 211.00 113.10  29.31 8.245 18.65 22.88 27.02 17.84 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
